[1] Husband and Wife-Management of Community PropertyLimitations on Power of Disposition.-Under Civ. Code, § 172, declaring that the husband cannot make a gift of the community personal property without the wife's consent, gifts made without the wife's consent are not void, but are voidable at her instance.
[2] Id.-Management of Community Property-Actions to Avoid
Transfers.-If a wife acts during the continuance of the community to avoid her husband's gift of community personal property without her consent, the whole gift will be avoided. If she acts after the community has been dissolved, the gift will be avoided to the extent of her half interest in the community property transferred. Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot maintain this action on the ground that the right to avoid gifts made in violation of section 172 is a right personal to the wife that does not survive her death and cannot be exercised by her executor.
Section 161a of the Civil Code defines the interests of husband and wife in community property: "The respective interests of the husband and wife in community property during continuance of the marriage relation are present, existing and equal interests under the management and control of the husband as is provided in sections 172 and 172a of the Civil Code. This section shall be construed as defining the respective [57 C.2d interests and rights of husband and wife in the commuuity property." Section 161a applies to all property involved in this case, for it was enacted in 1927 and the trial eourt found that the property was all acquired by the cOlllmunity after 1927. to give the consent required by section 172 and validly gave such consent plaintiff cannot set those gifts aside.
[7] Although" 'neither the general guardian nor a court has the power to dispose of the ward's property by way of gift' [citation], such rigid principle has its exception ""here allowances from the surplus income of the cstate are sought as 'donations for charitable and religious purposes' and with the object of 'carrying out the presumed wishes of' the incompe [te] [9] A guardian has no authority, however, to makc such gifts without prior court permission.
(Guardianship of Hall, supra.) Defendants do not claim that Marshall Harris secured such permission before, or after, making the contested gifts. Nor have they presented evidence tending to establish that Susie Harris would have approved the gifts had she been competent. The pre-March 28, 1957, gifts, as well as those made after that date, ,vere therefore made without the consent of Susie Harris as required by Civil Code section 172. The trial court correctly determined that plaintiff should recover one-half of all gifts of community property made by Marshall Harris to defendants between 1950 and his death in 1957.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred. []. The defendants' first contention on appeal is that the plaintiff Russell S. Harris, suing as executor of the estate of Susie Almeda Harris, does not have standing to sue to recover one-half of the community property transferred to defendants by Marshall C. Harris. We agree with this contention.
Civil Code, section 172, states (prior to the 1959 amendments), so far as is pertinent: "The husband has the management and control of the community personal property, with like absolute power of disposition, other than testamentary, as he has of his separate estate; provided, however, that he cannot make a gift of such community personal property, or dispose of the same without a valuable consideration, or sell, convey, ?r encumber the furniture, furnishings, or [57 C.2d fittings of the home, or the clothing or wearing apparel of the wife or minor children that is community, without the written consent of the wife."
A review of the California decisions involving Civil Code, section 172, indicates that the husband's transfer of personal community property, without valuable consideration or without the wife's consent, immediately vests the property in the donee subject to avoidance by the wife upon proof of facts necessary to that end. (Spreckels v. Spreckels (1916) 
